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Abstract
A central problem in Microeconomics is to design auctions with good revenue properties. In this set-
ting, the bidders’ valuations for the items are private knowledge, but they are drawn from publicly known
prior distributions. The goal is to find a truthful auction (no bidder can gain in utility by misreporting
her valuation) that maximizes the expected revenue.
Naturally, the optimal-auction is sensitive to the prior distributions. An intriguing question is to
design a truthful auction that is oblivious to these priors, and yet manages to get a constant factor of the
optimal revenue. Such auctions are called prior-free.
Goldberg et al. presented a constant-approximate prior-free auction when there are identical copies
of an item available in unlimited supply, bidders are unit-demand, and their valuations are drawn from
i.i.d. distributions. The recent work of Leonardi et al. [STOC 2012] generalized this problem to non
i.i.d. bidders, assuming that the auctioneer knows the ordering of their reserve prices. Leonardi et al.
proposed a prior-free auction that achieves a O(log∗ n) approximation. We improve upon this result, by
giving the first prior-free auction with constant approximation guarantee.
1 Introduction
We consider the following problem. There are multiple bidders interested in purchasing some items that
are being auctioned. Typically, the auction consists of two steps. First, the bidders disclose their private
valuations. Next, depending on this input, the items are allocated and every bidder is charged a price. An
interesting aspect of this problem is that a bidder is driven by her own selfish interest. As a result, she might
misreport her valuation while trying to manipulate the scheme to her advantage. An auction is truthful if it
is robust to such manipulations. Our goal is to find a truthful auction that maximizes the seller’s revenue -
the sum of the payments made by the bidders.
It is easy to see that there is no truthful auction that gives good revenue on every input. This motivates
the Bayesian approach to Auction Theory: Assume that the private valuation of each bidder is drawn from a
publicly known prior distribution, and design a truthful auction that maximizes the expected revenue. Here,
the expectation is over the priors of all the bidders, and the random choices made by the auctioneer.
For example, if we have one item, and one bidder whose valuation is a random variable v, then the
optimal auction offers the item to the bidder at some price p that maximizes the expected revenue p×Pr[v ≥
p]. This revenue-maximizing price is also known as the bidder’s reserve-price.
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The Bayesian approach can be justified from two different standpoints. (1) A prior can be interpreted as
a third person’s uncertain belief over the private type of the bidder. (2) Alternately, we can think of a prior
to be the average case scenario, when the same scheme is executed in multiple occasions and the bidder’s
type might change over time. This latter framework has an interesting implication, as described below.
Ideally, our auction should not be sensitive to these priors. Instead, the auction’s revenue should be
competitive against some appropriate benchmark, instance by instance. To complete the picture, we should
guarantee that in expectation over the priors, this benchmark is close to the optimal Bayesian revenue. This
will imply that our auction is prior-free, and still performs well on the average.
This paper deals with prior-free auction for digital goods. In this setting, the bidders are unit-demand,
the items are homogeneous and indivisible, and available in unlimited supply.
First, consider the scenario when the bidders’ valuations for the items are drawn from i.i.d. distribu-
tions. Here, the optimal Bayesian auction sets the same reserve price (say q) for every bidder: If a bidder’s
valuation is at least q, then she takes one copy of the item and makes a payment of q, otherwise she receives
zero items and makes zero payment. This leads to the following prior-free revenue-benchmark.
Let F denote the maximum revenue one can get by setting a uniform price across all the bidders. Now,
if our revenue is O(1)-competitive against F , instance by instance, then it is easy to see that (in expectation
over the priors) we shall be O(1)-competitive against the optimal Bayesian revenue. Unfortunately, for a
technical reason, no truthful auction can compete against the benchmark F on every input. To see this,
suppose that one bidder has infinite valuation, and every other bidder has zero valuation. As a result, the
benchmark F is set at infinity. In contrast, in any truthful auction, the price offered to the first bidder should
be independent of her own valuation. Hence, there is no truthful auction whose revenue is comparable to F .
To circumvent this difficulty, Goldberg et al. [11] proposed the modified benchmark F (2): It is the
maximum revenue one can get by setting a uniform price, under the condition that this price is at most the
second highest valuation (so that at least two bidders purchase the item). This rules out the bad example
described in the preceding paragraph. In their seminal work, Goldberg et al. [11] gave a truthful prior-free
auction whose revenue is constant competitive against F (2) on every input.
More recently, Leonardi et al. [10] extended the landscape of this problem by relaxing the iid assumption.
They allowed the bidders’ valuations to be drawn from independent, but not necessarily identical, prior
distributions: As in the iid case, here the optimal Bayesian auction offers one copy of the item to every
bidder at her reserve price. However, in contrast to the iid case, different bidders may have different reserve
prices. Thus, at first glance, the natural prior-free benchmark seems to be the maximum revenue that can be
obtained from any arbitrary pricing. Unfortunately, it is easy to see that this benchmark is equal to the social
welfare, and hence, no truthful auction can be competitive against this benchmark.
Leonardi et al. [10] argued that in order to get a positive result in the non-iid setting, the auctioneer
should be equipped with some information regarding the bidders’ priors. They made the following natural
assumption: The auctioneer knows the ordering of the bidders’ reserve prices.1 Without any loss of gener-
ality, the bidders are ordered according to 1, . . . , n, so that for all i < j, the reserve price for bidder i is at
most the reserve price for bidder j.
In this scenario, the optimal Bayesian revenue is attained by an increasing price ladder: For any two
bidders i < j, the price offered to bidder i is at most the price offered to bidder j. Due to a technical reason
similar to the one described for iid bidders, one needs to impose the further condition that the highest price
in this ladder is at most the second highest valuation. The maximum revenue from any such price ladder is
termed as the monotone-price benchmark M(2). Leonardi et al. gave a truthful auction that is O(log∗ n)
competitive against M(2).
Our Result We improve upon the work of Leonardi et al. [10], by giving the first truthful prior-free auction
1We emphasize that the auctioneer does not know the actual values of these reserves.
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that is O(1) competitive against the monotone-price benchmark M(2).
Remark The same result has been obtained independently in [18].
1.1 Previous Work
The Bayesian approach to auction theory was pioneered by Myerson [1]. He described the revenue-optimal
auction for selling one item. For auctions involving multiple items, his result holds if the bidders’ valuation
functions (defined over subsets of items) are single-dimensional. Several recent papers [3, 2, 4, 7, 8] ex-
tend Myerson’s work, and algorithmically characterize the revenue-optimal auctions in multi-dimensional
settings.
As mentioned before, Goldberg et al. [11] were the first to introduce the concept of prior-free auctions
for digital goods (see the survey in [13]), and to define the uniform-price benchmark F (2). Based on a
random-paritioning scheme, they presented a truthful auction that is constant-competitive against F (2). In
this scheme, the auctioneer randomly selects a “training” set of bidders, and uses the bids reported by this
training set to come up with an appropriate price-vector, which in turn, specifies the prices at which the item
is offered to the remaining bidders. This work was followed up by a series of papers [5, 6, 9]. At present,
the auction of Ichiba et al. [6] has the best known competitive ratio of 3.12 against the benchmark F (2).
The monotone-price benchmark M(2) considered in [10] follows from the work of Hartline et al. [12],
who laid the foundation for deriving suitable prior-free revenue-benchmarks for a wide variety of settings.
Another research direction that has been studied extensively is the topic of prior-independence. This line
of work is similar to the prior-free auctions, in the sense that the auctioneer is not aware of the distributions
from which the bidders’ private valuations are drawn. However, in contrast to the prior-free setting, here the
auction does not compete against some worst-case revenue-benchmark. Instead, the prior distributions are
used to directly analyze the auction’s expected revenue. We refer the reader to the papers [16, 17] for more
details.
2 Notations and Preliminaries
There are a set I = {1, . . . , n} of unit-demand bidders, and an indivisible item which is available in unlim-
ited supply. Bidder i ∈ I has a private valuation vi for the item. The notation v = (v1, . . . , vn) represents
the valuation-profile of the bidders.
In an auction, the bidders first disclose their valuations. We use the symbol bi for the reported valuation
of bidder i ∈ I , which is called her “bid”. Depending on the input bid-vector b = (b1, . . . , bn), the
auctioneer allocates the items and every bidder is charged a price.
Let Xi(b) ∈ {0, 1} be the indicator variable corresponding to the allocation of bidder i ∈ I , and let
pi(b) denote her payment. The auctioneer’s revenue is equal to
∑
i∈I pi(b).
The utility of bidder i ∈ I is ui(b) = vi ·Xi(b)− pi(b). The notation b−i represents the profile of all
bids except that of bidder i ∈ I . In a truthful auction, we have:
ui(b−i, vi) ≥ max {0, ui(b−i, bi)} for all i,b−i, bi, vi.
In other words, an auction is truthful iff no bidder can gain in utility by misreporting her valuation.
A randomized auction is a probability distribution over deterministic auctions. It is truthful iff all the
deterministic auctions in its support are truthful.
In this paper, we only consider truthful auctions. Hence, without any loss of generality, every bidder’s
reported bid coincides with her private valuation, and we use the notations b and v interchangeably.
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For any subset of bidders S ⊆ I , let b(2)S denote the second highest bid in the set {bi : i ∈ S}. A price
vector PS offers the item at price PS(i) to every bidder i ∈ S.
Definition 1. A price vector PS over S ⊆ I is uniform iff
• For all i, j ∈ S, we have PS(i) = PS(j) = q (say).
• Furthermore, we have q ≤ b(2)S .
Definition 2. A price vector PS over S ⊆ I is monotone iff
• We have PS(i) ≤ PS(j) whenever i < j and i, j ∈ S.
• Furthermore, we have maxi∈S {PS(i)} ≤ b(2)S .
Note that the concept of a monotone price vector implies an underlying ordering of the set of bidders
I = {1, . . . , n}. For ease of notation, we assume that bidder i ∈ I comes before bidder j ∈ I in this
ordering iff i < j. The prices must respect this ordering, meaning that if bidder i is offered a price, then it
should be lower than the price offered to every bidder j > i. In contrast, the valuations of the bidders can
be arbitrary, so that we might have bi > bj for two bidders j > i.
In a price vector PS defined over S ⊆ I , a bidder i ∈ S takes the item iff she gets nonnegative utility
(i.e., iff bi ≥ PS(i)). Thus, the revenue from PS is given by:
REV(PS) =
∑
i∈S : bi≥PS(i)
PS(i).
We are now ready to define the prior-free revenue-benchmarks.
Definition 3. The uniform-price benchmark F (2)S is the maximum revenue from a uniform price vector
defined over S ⊆ I .
F
(2)
S = max
PS is uniform
REV(PS).
Definition 4. The monotone-price benchmark M(2)S is the maximum revenue from a monotone price vector
defined over S ⊆ I .
M
(2)
S = max
PS is monotone
REV(PS).
We present a truthful auction whose revenue is at least a constant fraction of the monotone-price bench-
mark M(2)I . We do not try to optimize the value of this constant, which is left as an interesting open
question.
3 The Auction
Suppose that we have partitioned the bidders into two subsets S ⊆ I and T = I \S. Consider a price vector
PS (resp. PT ) defined over the subset S (resp. T ). We say that PT is the extension of PS if and only if for
all i ∈ T , we have:
PT (i) =
{
maxj∈S : j<iPS(j) if {j ∈ S : j < i} 6= ∅;
0 otherwise.
(1)
Let Q2 denote the set of prices that are in powers of 2, that is, Q2 = {2t : t ∈ Z}, where Z is the set of all
integers. We say that a price vector PS is discretized if and only if PS(i) ∈ Q2 for all agents i ∈ S.
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Hybrid Auction
INPUT: Bid-vector b = (b1, . . . , bn).
Select a uniformly random subset of bidders
A ⊆ I , and let B = I \ A.
Using dynamic programming, find the discretized and monotone price vector defined over A that
generates maximum revenue. Let PA be this price vector, and let PB denote the extension of PA.
Consider an indicator random variable Y that follows a uniform distribution over {0, 1}.
IF Y = 1:
Run the truthful auction in [6] that is 3.12-competitive against the benchmark F (2)I .
ELSE IF Y = 0:
FOR ALL bidders i ∈ B:
IF bi ≥ PB(i) THEN
Allocate one item to bidder i at price PB(i).
ELSE
Bidder i gets no item and makes zero payment.
Figure 1: A truthful auction that is constant competitive against the monotone price benchmark M(2)I .
Our auction is based on the random partitioning framework, and it is described in Figure 1.
With probability 1/2, we run a truthful auction whose revenue is within a constant fraction of the
uniform-price benchmark F (2)I . With the remaining probability, we run the general scheme: Include ev-
ery bidder i ∈ I in subset A with probability 1/2, independently of the other bidders. Next, find the revenue
maximizing discretized monotone price vector PA, and apply the extension of PA to the bidders in B.
Theorem 1. The Hybrid Auction (see Figure 1) is truthful.
Proof. We only need to show that the auction is truthful when we run the general scheme, i.e. when Y = 0.
The random subset A ⊆ I is chosen independently of the input bid-vector b. If a bidder i ∈ I is included
in the subset A, then she gets zero utility. On the other hand, if she is included in the subset B, then she is
offered the item at a price that is independent of her own bid. The theorem follows.
3.1 Revenue Guarantee
To show that our auction is O(1)-competitive against the benchmark M(2)I , we shall consider two cases.
Case 1. The ratio F (2)I /M
(2)
I is at least some constant. Note that with probability 1/2, we execute an
auction which is O(1)-competitive against F (2)I . Hence, in this case, our revenue is clearly within a constant
factor of M(2)I .
Case 2. The ratio F (2)I /M
(2)
I is very small. If this is the case, then we prove that the expected value of
REV(PB) is within a constant factor of M(2)I . Note that with probability 1/2, we run the general scheme
whose revenue is given by REV(PB). Hence, we remain O(1)-competitive against M(2)I .
To carry out the plan described above, we need to introduce some definitions.
5
Definition 5. For any price q ∈ Q2 and any integer l ≥ 0, we say that q is a level-l-price iff
M
(2)
I /2
l+1 < q ≤M
(2)
I /2
l.
Since the upper and lower limits of a level differ by a factor of 2, there is exactly one level-l-price in Q2.
Throughout this paper, we shall use the symbol ql to denote this unique level-l-price in Q2.
Definition 6. Consider an ordered pair of bidders i < j, and the level-l-price ql ∈ Q2. If both the bidders’
valuations are larger than the price (that is, bi ≥ ql and bj ≥ ql), then we say that (i, j, ql) is a level-l-triple.
The concept of a triple uses the underlying ordering of the set I . Accordingly, a bidder k ∈ I belongs
to the triple (i, j, ql) iff i ≤ k ≤ j. A bidder in a triple (i, j, ql) is winning iff her valuation is larger than the
price ql.
Definition 7. The set of winning bidders in a triple (i, j, ql) is defined as:
Wijql = {k ∈ I : i ≤ k ≤ j and bk ≥ ql}.
We say that a triple is balanced iff its winning bidders are evenly partitioned among the random subsets
A,B.
Definition 8. A triple (i, j, ql) is balanced iff
1
3
× |Wijql| ≤ |A ∩Wijql| ≤
2
3
× |Wijql|.
Finally, we say that a triple is large if it contains sufficiently many winning bidders.
Definition 9. A level-l-triple (i, j, ql) is large iff
|Wijql| ≥ 288l.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.1.1, we show that certain important events
occur with constant probability. In Section 3.1.2, we show that conditioned on these important events, our
auction generates good revenue.
3.1.1 Important Events
Let E1(b) denote the event that REV(PA) ≥M(2)I /6. Let E2(l,b) denote the event that every large level-l-
triple is balanced. Define the event E2(b) as follows.
E2(b) =
⋂
l≥24
E2(l,b) (2)
We shall show that both the events E1(b) and E2(b) occur simultaneously with probability at least 1/32
(see Theorem 3.6).
Lemma 3.1. We have: Pr [E1(b)] ≥ 116 .
Proof. Leonardi et al. proved that M(2)A ≥M(2)I /3 with probability at least 1/16 (see Lemma 3.2 in [10]).
Since PA is the discretized monotone price vector with maximum revenue, we have REV(PA) ≥ M(2)A /2.
The lemma follows.
Claim 3.2. For every integer l ≥ 0, the number of level-l-triples is at most 22l+2.
6
Proof. Consider a bidder k whose valuation bk is at least ql. Since ql > M(2)I /2l+1, we infer that bk >
M
(2)
I /2
l+1
. Thus, there are at most 2l+1 such bidders. Since a level-l-triple (i, j, ql) is uniquely determined
by two bidders i < j having valuations at least ql, it is easy to see that there can be at most (2l+1)2 = 22l+2
level-l-triples.
We shall use the following version of the Chernoff bound [14].
Theorem 3.3. Let T1, . . . , Tm be i.i.d random variables such that Ti ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Define
their sum as T =
∑m
i=1 Ti, and let µ = E[T ]. For all 0 < δ < 1:
Pr[(1 − δ)µ ≤ T ≤ (1 + δ)µ] ≥ 1− 2× exp
(
−
µδ2
4
)
.
Claim 3.4. We have:
Pr[E2(l,b)] ≥ 1− 1/2
l, for all l ≥ 24.
Proof. Fix any large level-l-triple (i, j, ql). By definition, the number of winning bidders in (i, j, ql) is at
least 288l. Since each of these bidders is included in the set A independently and uniformly at random,
Theorem 3.3 implies that the triple (i, j, ql) is not balanced with probability at most 2/e4l . By Claim 3.2,
there are at most 22l+2 level-l-triples. Applying union bound, the probability that some level-l-triple is not
balanced is at most 22l+2 × 2/e4l ≤ 1/2l, for l ≥ 24.
Lemma 3.5. We have: Pr[E2(b)] ≥ 31/32.
Proof. Applying union-bound, we infer that
1− Pr[E2(b)] ≤
∑
l≥24
(1− Pr[E2(l,b)]) ≤
∑
l≥24
1
2l
≤
1
32
.
Theorem 3.6. We have: Pr[E1(b) ∩ E2(b)] ≥ 1/32.
Proof. Follows from applying union bound on Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.5.
3.1.2 Main Analysis
Under the monotone price vector PA, let Al ⊆ A denote the subset of bidders who take the item at the
level-l-price ql.
Al = {i ∈ A : bi ≥ PA(i), and PA(i) = ql}.
Note that Al respects the ordering of the set of bidders I = {1, . . . , n}. Specifically, if we have three bidders
i < j < k such that (a) i, j, k ∈ A, (b) each of them has a valuation at least ql, and (c) i, k ∈ Al; then we
must have that j ∈ Al.
Let REV(PA, l) denote the contribution towards REV(PA) by the bidders in Al. Accordingly, we get:
REV(PA, l) = |Al| × ql, and REV(PA) =
∑
l≥0
REV(PA, l).
Definition 10. A level l is good w.r.t. PA iff l ≥ 24 and |Al| ≥ 288l; otherwise the level is bad.
The next claim implies that all the bad levels l ≥ 24 contribute relatively little towards REV(PA).
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Claim 3.7. We have: ∑
l≥24 : l is bad
REV(PA, l) ≤
1
18
×M
(2)
I .
Proof. Consider any level l ≥ 24 that is bad. Since |Al| < 288l and the level-l-price in PA is at most
M
(2)
I /2
l
, we have:
REV(PA, l) = |Al| × ql <
288l
2l
×M
(2)
I .
Summing over all such levels, we get
∑
l≥24 : l is bad
REV(PA, l) ≤
∑
l≥24
288l
2l
×M
(2)
I
≤
∑
l≥24
1
2l/2
×M
(2)
I
≤
1
18
×M
(2)
I .
Now, we are ready to prove the revenue guarantee.
Theorem 3.8. The expected revenue of the Hybrid Auction (see Figure 1) is within a constant factor of the
monotone-price benchmark M(2)I .
Proof. We shall consider two mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases, and show that in the first (resp.
second) case, the expected revenue of our auction is at least 1/2700 (resp. 1/2304) times the benchmark
M
(2)
I .
Case 1 432×F (2)I ≥M
(2)
I .
With probability 1/2, we execute the auction of Ichiba et al. [6], which is 3.12 competitive against the
benchmark F (2)I . Hence, the expected revenue of our auction scheme is at least F
(2)
I /(2 × 3.12), which in
turn, is lower bounded by M(2)I /2700.
Case 2 432×F (2)I <M
(2)
I .
We first claim:
23∑
l=0
REV(PA, l) ≤M
(2)
I /18 (3)
For the sake of contradiction, suppose that the above equation is not true. In that case, there is some level
l∗ ∈ [0, 23] with REV(PA, l∗) = |Al∗ | × ql∗ >M
(2)
I /(18 × 24).
Now, consider the price vector P′I which offers the item at price ql∗ to every bidder: We have P′I(i) =
ql∗ for all i ∈ I . Since PA is a monotone price vector and Al∗ is non-empty, there are at least two bidders
in A whose bids are lower bounded by ql∗ . Hence, the price vector P′I is uniform, and we get:
F
(2)
I ≥ REV(P
′
I) ≥ REV(PA, l∗) ≥M
(2)
I /(18 × 24).
This contradicts our assumption that 432 × F (2)I < M
(2)
I . Accordingly, we infer that equation (3) must be
true.
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Next, note that conditioned on the event E1(b), we have
REV(PA) ≥
1
6
M
(2)
I (4)
From equations (3), (4) and Claim 3.7, it follows that
Under event E1(b),
∑
l is good
REV(PA, l) ≥
1
18
M
(2)
I (5)
For the rest of the proof, condition on the event E1(b) ∩ E2(b).
Consider any good level l. Let the first (resp. last) bidder in Al be denoted by i (resp. j): For all k ∈ Al,
we have i ≤ k ≤ j. Since PA(i) = PA(j) = ql and bi, bj ≥ ql, we infer that (i, j, ql) is a level-l-triple.
The number of winning bidders in this triple is at least |Al|. Since the level l is good, we have |Al| ≥ 288l.
Thus, we conclude that the triple (i, j, ql) is large. Furthermore, since the level l is good, we have l ≥ 24.
By definition, the triple (i, j, ql) is balanced under the event E1(b) ∩ E2(b). In other words, at least one
third of its winning bidders are assigned to the set B. Thus, we get:
|Wijql ∩B| ≥
1
2
|Wijql ∩A| =
1
2
|Al|.
Furthermore, since the price vector PB is the extension of PA, we have PB(k) = ql for all bidders k ∈
Wijql ∩B. Hence, the contribution towards REV(PB) by such bidders is at least REV(PA, l)/2. Summing
over all good levels, we conclude:
REV(PB) ≥
1
2
×
∑
l is good
REV(PA, l) ≥
1
36
×M
(2)
I .
The second inequality follows from equation (5).
To summarize, the event E1(b) ∩ E2(b) occurs with probability at least 1/32 (see Theorem 3.6), and
conditioned on this event, we have REV(PB) ≥M(2)I /36. Finally, we execute this scheme with probability
1/2. Putting all these observations together, the expected revenue of our auction is at least
1
2
×
1
32
×
M
(2)
I
36
=
M
(2)
I
2304
.
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